Media coverage of humanitarian crises is widely believed to influence charitable giving, yet this assertion has received little empirical scrutiny. Using Internet donations after the 2004 tsunami as a case study, we show that media coverage of disasters has a dramatic impact on donations to relief agencies, with an additional minute of nightly news coverage increasing donations by 0.036 standard deviations from the mean, or 13.2% of the average daily donation for the typical relief agency. Similarly, an additional 700-word story in the New York Times or Wall Street Journal raises donations by 18.2% of the daily average. These results are robust to controls for the timing of news coverage and tax considerations. We repeat the analysis using instrumental variables to account for endogeneity bias, and the estimates are unchanged. However, we also find that the effect of news coverage varies considerably by relief agency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Early research into the economics of private giving to charitable organizations classifies the primary motivation for giving as either fostering the provision of public goods or increasing one's private consumption. The "public goods" model is exemplified by donors who give based on the anticipated return in some form of public good (Warr 1982; Roberts 1984; Bergstrom et al. 1986 ); examples from the literature range from public parks that the donor may frequent to medical research that may benefit the donor at some future time. By contrast, the "private consumption" model arises when donors derive utility from the act of giving, either because the well-being of others enters their own utility functions directly or because the public approval associated with giving benefits the donor (Arrow 1972; Steinberg 1987) . For example, conspicuous donations may signal wealth, thereby enabling donors to interact with individuals in higher socioeconomic strata (Glazer and Konrad 1996) . However, individuals may receive a "warm glow" from making charitable contributions (Andreoni 1989 (Andreoni , 1990 ) even when their donations displace those of other donors, when there are no direct social benefits to donors, and when the beneficiaries of charitable giving are far away. Rose-Ackerman (1982 , 1996 posits that some individuals derive utility from charitable programs only if they "buy in," i.e., if they personally donate. Complementary research in this area suggests that the utility gains from making charitable donations depend critically on the behavior of other donors. For example, Duncan (2004) proposes that some donors may engage in "impact philanthropy" in which individuals make charitable gifts only if their contributions represent a large proportion of the total received by a charitable organization. At the other extreme, Sugden (1984) suggests that individuals have a distaste for freeriding, and hence donate to charitable organizations if others in their peer group have also donated. In this "commitment" model, individuals also believe that they should donate at least as much as members of the reference group.
Regardless of whether motivated by public goods or private consumption, the majority of American households contribute to charitable causes. In 2000, for example, 69% of U.S.
households made charitable donations, with the average contributing household donating $1,942 (Steinberg and Wilhelm 2003) . Moreover, both the beneficiaries of charitable giving and the level of donations are influenced by world events, as evidenced by the $2.4 billion in donations made to the victims of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, by the $1.6 billion raised by U.S. charities for disaster relief after the 26 December 2004 tsunami, and by the $3.3 billion in cash raised by U.S. charities for disaster relief after Hurricane Katrina. These striking examples of generosity coincided with highly-concentrated media coverage in the weeks following the disasters, suggesting a kind of "CNN effect" for charitable giving (Robinson 2002) .
Certainly, relief workers have witnessed the link between media coverage and donations that are used to fund daily operations. For example, private donations to relief agencies during the early stages of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 had been sufficient to support approximately one million displaced Rwandans, but after the tribulations of O.J. Simpson and Tanya Harding eclipsed Rwanda in international news, funding for relief activities began to decline. The perception among many aid workers in the camps for Rwandan refugees (including one of the authors) was that the public had turned its back on the crises, with potentially dire consequences.
1
Yet while anecdotal evidence abounds, few studies have systematically assessed the relationship between media coverage and the behavior of private donors, and those that do suffer from important analytical shortcomings. For example, an analysis undertaken by the Institute for Philanthropy finds that 14 of 15 surveyed British philanthropists believe that the media has the power to encourage private giving, with 11 of the 15 being inspired by the media to make charitable donations themselves (Breeze 2005) . Similarly, Olsen, Cartenson, and Høyen (2003) find a high correlation between the total number of relevant articles in western newspapers and the total amount of humanitarian assistance allocated to victims of the flooding in Mozambique in 2000 and the cyclone in eastern India in 1999. Unfortunately, neither sample is large enough to make generalizations, nor is there any attempt to quantify the magnitude of the causal relationship.
This study thus assesses the effect of media coverage on donations to relief agencies in the aftermath of the 26 December 2004 tsunami, an ideal case study because relief agencies concentrated their efforts on tsunami victims for several months, suggesting that donations to relief agencies were in fact donations to tsunami relief. Specifically, we consider the effects of reports on three U.S. nightly network news broadcasts and articles in two prominent newspapers 1 Oxfam Canada incorporated this perception in a highly successful advertisement in nationally-circulated newspapers. A large headline shouted, "O.J. SIMPSON LIMITED TO TEN VISITORS A DAY." Below, in much smaller print, the text read, "In other news: '500,000 Rwandan slaughtered. Another half million fighting for lives in refugee camps.'" on private donations to eight U.S. relief agencies. To minimize recall error and to eliminate the time lag between when news reports are seen or read and when donations are received by relief agencies, we focus exclusively on donations made via the Internet, which accounted for roughly half of the total value of donations to tsunami relief made by individuals (El Nasser 2005) . In the empirical analysis, we control for donor fatigue, tax incentives, and agency-specific effects to better isolate the effect of media coverage. Finally, to alleviate concerns of omitted variable bias associated with other forms of reporting and fund-raising and concerns of simultaneity associated with news coverage of the charitable response, we use media coverage of the Iraq war and casualties among U.S. military personnel to instrument for media coverage of the tsunami.
We find that an additional minute of network television news coverage increases a given day's donations by 0.036 standard deviations from the mean, or 13.2% for the average agency.
One additional story in the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal increases a given day's donations by 0.050 standard deviations from the mean, or 18.2% for the average agency. Results are similar using instrumental variables, underscoring the robustness of the estimates.
Additionally, the marginal effect of media coverage differs considerably by agency, with some agencies seeing donations rise dramatically with additional media coverage, while others see donations hold steady or even decline. Finally, we find considerable evidence for declining donations associated with donor fatigue as well as evidence for the effectiveness of tax incentives in increasing donations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II provides details about the tsunami disaster and the media coverage that ensued; Section III describes the data and variables used; Section IV describes the empirical specification and identification; Section V provides the results of this study; and Section VI concludes. Second, the beaches of Southeast Asia are familiar to American tourists who have visited in increasing numbers in recent decades (Hall and Page 2000) . Third, tax incentives have been shown to motivate charitable giving (e.g., Clotfelter 1985; Kingma 1989; Slemrod 1989; Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter 2002; Green and McClelland 2002) , including giving to international relief and development organizations (Ribar and Wilhelm 1995 Amazon.com added links to charities on their own websites, the latter raising $2.5 million for the Red Cross in 24 hours (Slavin 2004) . Finally, extraordinary treatment of the disaster by the media may have prompted extraordinary donations by Americans, particularly in the context of Rose-Ackerman's (1982 , 1996 "buy in" model of giving coupled with Sugden's (1986) "commitment" model, whereby individuals donate because they feel compelled to help and because their friends and colleagues have also donated. As noted above, the eight agencies represent the broad spectrum of non-profit organizations offering assistance to tsunami victims, and their daily receipts vary considerably.
II. THE TSUNAMI, THE MEDIA, AND CHARITABLE GIVING
To account for this variation and to make comparisons across agencies possible, we calculate zscores for each agency's collections on each day; the z-score is defined as the number of standard deviations from the mean across the period of study.
Furthermore, five of the eight agencies included in the study received no donations on at least one day during the study period. Indeed, 118 of the observed 714 daily Internet donations for a given relief agency are zero, suggesting the existence of a corner solution response.
Because of censoring at zero, ordinary least squares is an inconsistent estimator. To circumvent this problem, the causal effect of media coverage on donations is estimated via a tobit model:
where DON i,t is Internet donations received by agency i on day t. MEDIA t is the media coverage of the tsunami and recovery efforts on day t, measured either as nightly news reporting on the three largest networks or as word counts in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. X is a vector that includes the log number of days since the tsunami to account for donor fatigue, a A final endogeneity concern arises if the eight relief agencies included in the study are not representative of agencies involved in tsunami relief more generally. If compiling daily records of Internet donations is costly, for example, then the eight agencies that provided data are likely to be either large enough to dedicate staff time to data collection or to be efficient enough that data collection is not costly. Given that the eight agencies differ by size, focus, religious affiliation, and other characteristics and that virtually all relief agencies track Internet giving electronically, we find either possibility unlikely. In addition, virtually all of the agencies that worked in the affected areas accepted online donations and all eight organizations fall under the purview of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Still, we cannot rule out the possibility that the eight agencies included in the study are not fully representative of all relief agencies. Table 2 Both media coverage and the response of individual donors to relief agencies decay as days, weeks, and months pass, as the images become less shocking, and as individual givers experience donor fatigue. To account for these nonlinear time trends, the log number of days since the tsunami struck is included as an additional regressor. In each of the four specifications, the point estimate is negative and significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level.
V. RESULTS
Total donations to the eight agencies on the tenth day after the tsunami are predicted to fall by 0.037 standard deviations from the mean (13.5%) from those received on the ninth day, 4 while donations on the fiftieth day are predicted to fall by 0.008 standard deviations (2.9%) from those received on the forty-ninth day. The extended tax deadline also produced a dramatic -if very short -spike in donations (Figure 2 and by 0.065 standard deviations (23.8%), respectively. All of these estimated coefficients are larger than those for total nightly news coverage, although this reflects the very high correlation of minutes allocated to tsunami coverage among the three largest networks. words, an average among major daily newspaper, raises donations by 18.2%. These results are all significant at the 1% level. In addition, the effects of passing time and the tax extension are very similar to the estimated coefficients calculated when assessing the impact of television coverage.
While the above results are robust across specifications, endogeneity concerns remain.
As noted in Section IV, both simultaneity and omitted variable bias may be problematic. given day than is broadcast news. Thus, the estimates which include instrumental variables will focus only television coverage of the tsunami. Table 5 describes the effect of television coverage of the tsunami disaster on private donations to relief agencies using IV tobit estimation to control for any extant simultaneity and omitted variable bias. As above, private donations to relief agencies are expressed in terms of zscores and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported. Column 1 presents results that employ daily television coverage of the Iraq war as the instrument and Column 2 presents results that use the number of U.S. military casualties in Iraq by day as the instrument. The estimated effect of nightly news coverage is essentially unchanged from the tobit results without instrumentation presented in Table 1 : an additional minute of television news coverage raises donations to relief agencies by between 0.036 and 0.038 standard deviations from the mean, or between 13.2% and 13.9%. The estimates are significant at the 10% level when using U.S.
military casualties in Iraq as the instrument and at the 1% level when using television coverage of the Iraq war as an instrument. These results suggest that neither simultaneity bias nor omitted variable bias is a serious problem, and the subsequent results do not include instrumentation.
Finally, Table 6 includes media-agency interaction terms to determine whether the marginal effect of media coverage differs for each relief agency using tobit estimation. Again, suggesting that the source of information is also important for some relief agencies.
Together, these results show that both television and newspaper coverage of the 2004 tsunami had a positive and significant effect on Internet donations to relief agencies. However, the effect varies greatly by agency, and media coverage can lead to lower donations in some cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the empirical relationship between media coverage of humanitarian crises and private donations to relief agencies. The 2004 tsunami provides an excellent case study because it prompted unprecedented media coverage, unprecedented charitable giving, and a great deal of speculation about the relationship between the two.
We assess the effects of tsunami-related reporting on ABC World News Tonight, the CBS Evening News, and NBC Nightly News and tsunami-related articles in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal on donations to eight U.S. charities that provided services to victims of the tsunami. Because Internet donations played an important role in facilitating giving after the tsunami, because they are more likely to reflect contemporaneous media coverage of the disaster, and because they are not subject to recall bias, we exclude other forms of giving in the analysis.
We also control for donor fatigue via a variable measuring the number of days after the tsunami that donations were made, for tax incentives via a dummy indicating the last day that donations were eligible for 2004 deductions, and for agency-specific effects via a series of dummies.
We find that an additional minute allocated to tsunami coverage on the evening news increases that day's donations by 0.036 standard deviations from the mean, or 13.2% for the average agency. Similarly, 100 additional words allocated to tsunami coverage in major newspapers increase that day's donations by 0.007 standard deviations from the mean, or 2.6%
for the average agency; a typical 700-word article thus raises donations by 18.2% on average.
Simultaneity concerns may arise due to media coverage of donors' generosity. Similarly, omitted variables such as news coverage of the tsunami in other media sources, advertising, and direct mail campaigns undertaken by relief agencies may bias the estimated effect of media coverage upward. To account for this possibility, we employ two different instrumental variables -media coverage of the Iraq war and U.S. military casualties in Iraq. These instruments are strong predictors of television news coverage while remaining plausibly exogenous to donations to relief agencies, yet instrumenting for media coverage of the tsunami does not appreciably affect the point estimates.
Next, we find that the marginal effect of media coverage differs considerably among the This result provides further evidence that tax policy complements media coverage in inducing donations to charities.
From the perspective of economic theory, U.S. residents donating to victims half a world away provides further evidence for Andreoni's (1989 Andreoni's ( , 1990 ) "warm glow" motivation for individual altruism. Because most Internet donations are unheralded, it further appears that many donors to tsunami relief were neither motivated by conspicuous giving for socioeconomic recognition (Glazer and Konrad 1996) nor by opportunities to partake in "impact philanthropy" (Duncan 2004) . Instead, people may have participated in charitable giving at these record levels precisely because so many others were also giving (Sugden, 1984) . It is our hope that the television and newspaper media will also recognize this relationship and that the beneficiaries of relief agencies' efforts will enter into their calculus when deciding which news stories to present. In this way, celebrity trials may no longer push disasters out of the media spotlight. NOTE: Absolute value of robust z-statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% NOTE: Absolute value of robust z-statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Executive Summary
This paper investigates the empirical relationship between media coverage of humanitarian crises and private donations to relief agencies. The 2004 tsunami provides an excellent case study because it prompted unprecedented media coverage of a humanitarian crisis, unprecedented charitable giving to relief agencies, and a great deal of speculation about the relationship between the two.
We assess the effects of tsunami-related reporting on the three network nightly news broadcasts and tsunami-related articles in two major newspapers on donations to eight U.S. charities that provided services to tsunami victims. We focus on donations made via the Internet in particular to minimize time lags between media coverage and the receipt of a donation. In order to make meaningful comparisons across all 8 agencies, we convert each day's donations to deviations from the mean daily donation. To better isolate the effect of media coverage, our analysis controls for the passage of time and for tax incentives for making charitable donations. We find:
Media coverage of the tsunami clearly affected donations to relief agencies, even controlling for the passage of time and tax incentives. One additional minute of tsunami coverage on the evening news increases donations on that day by 0.036 standard deviations from the mean, or 13.2% for the average agency.
One hundred additional words allocated to tsunami coverage in major newspapers increase that day's donations by 0.007 standard deviations from the mean, or 2.6% for the average agency; a typical 700-word article thus raises donations by 18.2% on average.
Donations decline over time, providing evidence of donor fatigue. By contrast, the Tsunami Disaster Aid Tax Relief Act prolonged high levels of giving and contributed to record giving.
Unfortunately, these results are subject to two important statistical limitations. First, while we account for time and tax incentives, we are unable to control for other aspects of charitable giving such as direct mail campaigns, advertising, and news coverage in other media. Second, the unprecedented giving occasionally became news itself, raising questions about the direction of causality between media coverage and charitable giving. To account for these possibilities, we employ an econometric method known as instrumental variables. In doing so, we find:
Correcting for these statistical limitations does not affect the estimated effect of media coverage on charitable giving, i.e., the main results are extremely robust.
Finally, we consider the possibility that the effect of media coverage on charitable giving is not uniform across relief agencies. We find:
While giving to most of the charities included in the study increases with media coverage, donations to some agencies were not impacted by media coverage.
These results clearly demonstrate the large, causal, impact of media coverage of humanitarian crises on charitable giving to the majority of relief agencies. We hope that this finding will enter the calculus of news media when deciding which stories to present.
